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The Twilight of 
Welfare Criminology* 
A Reply to Judge Bazelon 
STEPHEN J. MORSE** 
LOS ANGELES 
In his article, "The Morality of the Crim­
inal Law,"1Chief Judge David L. Bazelon chides 
society for not facing the hard moral questions 
posed by crime and the criminal justice system. 
According to him, our treatment of crimi­
nals, especially poor offenders, and our doc­
trines of criminal responsibility have enabled 
us comfortably to avoid recognition of the in­
justice perpetrated by the criminal law and the 
criminal justice system. 
In this reponse I shall focus on Judge Baze­
lon's answers to the following crucial questions: 
"What should be the standard of criminal re­
sponsibility?" and "What alternative responses 
to the crime problem should be made?" The 
* The present article is excerpted from a version 
which first appeared in 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 
(1976), and is reprinted here with the permission of 
the editors of the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW. 
** Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Southern California Law Center. A. B. 1966, Tufts 
University; J. D. 1970, Ph. D. 1973, Harvard Univer­
sity. 
1 Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976) [hereinafter cited 
as Bazelon). 
answer to these questions must be derived from 
an even more basic one which he considers to 
be the central question: "What role should 
moral concepts play in the administration 
of criminal justice?"2 
To explicate the answers to these questions, 
the Judge describes two polar positions con­
cerning criminal justice. They are the "law 
as external constraint" (the conservative "law 
and order") position and the "law as an agency 
fostering the internalization of control" (the 
liberal "social justice") position. 
Addressing himself to the problems of crim­
inal responsibility, Judge Bazelon asserts that 
the law-and-order devotee determines ques­
tions of responsibility and punishment solely 
in terms of the maximization of order; the 
outcome is said to be an immoral, repressive 
order. The social justice adherent, as viewed by 
Judge Bazelon, balances questions of order 
against the "moral sense": before considering 
what community safety requires, he considers 
what social justice requires.3 
(continued on page 18) 
2 Bazelon, supra note 1, at 386. 
3 !d. at 388. 
11 
Welfare Criminology 
(continued from page 11) 
Delving deeply into the polarity stated 
above, however, one finds no disagreement on 
the fundamental mor:�l principle that "the law 
should not convict unless it can condemn." 
Both law-and-order advocates and social justice 
advocates believe that a defendant should not 
be convicted and condemned unless the Judge's 
three conditions are met: 
(1) a condemnable act was committed; 
(2) the actor c:m be condenmed because 
he could reasonably have been ex­
pected to conform his behavior to 
the law; and 
(3) society's own conduct in relation to 
the actor entitles it to condemn him 
for his act.4 
Even so, those holding the two positions 
would differ in their disposition of many cases; 
the law-and-order advocate would consider 
more persons criminally responsible. But Judge 
Bazelon is incorrect in assuming that the dif­
ference stems from the fact that law-and-order 
advocates consider only order when deciding 
who may be condemned. The true reason for 
the difference is that law-and-order advocates 
tend to adhere to a very different model of 
human behavior, one that leads them to reach 
different conclusions about social and personal 
responsibility. The social justice advocate, evi­
dently, is willing to believe that large numbers 
of persons have little choice regarding their be­
havior and should not be held responsible for 
it. The law-and-order advocate believes that 
most persons do choose their behavior and 
should be held accountable for it. 
Models of Behavioral Choice and Criminal 
Responsibility 
Judge Bazelon's model of criminal be­
havior assumes that environmental and other 
personal background pressures affect an ac­
tor's choice to violate the law more than 
society is willing to admit. Consequently, he 
believes that many defendants now condemned 
for their behavior should not be condemned, 
because they could not reasonably have been 
4 !d. 
expected to obey the laws they violated. As 
possible examples of unfree behavior choices, 
Judge Bazelon points to the following cases: 
a black youth who reacts violently to a racial 
taunt; a man who steals to feed hjs family; a 
drug user who buys drugs to feed his habit; 
and a super-patriot who burglarizes in the 
name of national security .5 The Judge be­
lieves that our crimin:.ll justice system is im­
moral because society is too willing to a void 
facing its own responsibility for the causation 
of crime, and because society is too willing 
to condemn allegedly unfree actors to pro­
duce order.6 
To force society to face the fundamental 
moral question of who may be condemned, 
Judge Bazelon suggests the adoption of a very 
broad criminal defense based upon nonre­
sponsibility. The Judge's test instructs the 
jury "that a defendant is not responsible 
if at the time of his unlawful conduct his men­
tal or emotional processes or behavior con­
trols were impaired to such an extent that he 
cannot justly be held responsible for his act." 
His reason for adopting this test is that it di­
rectly gives to the jury the task of deciding 
blameworthiness according to community stan­
dards, and it would allow the jury to hear the 
broadest range of evidence concerning the 
causes, nature, and extent of behavioral im­
pairments. 
Judge Bazelon proposes that the inquiry 
into responsibility be broadened beyond insan­
ity and the medical model. He now suggests 
that the law recognize that behavior is affected 
by many factors. Under his revised test, the 
jury properly could hear testimony and argu­
ment on any cause that might affect the de­
fendant's formation of mens rea, or on any 
cause that affected his emotional processes and 
behavioral controls. 
If Judge Bazelon's model of behavioral 
choice were correct, then his instruction would 
indeed force society directly to decide whom it 
may morally and justly condemn. But it is 
5/d. at 389. 
6/d. 
7 !d. at 396,quoting United States v. Brawner, 471 
F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(Bazelon C.J., concur­
ring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in origi­
nal). 
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my view that, with few exceptions, there is 
no reason to believe that persons are not re­
sponsible for their behavior. If this is so, the de­
fense of nonresponsibility should be narrowed 
rather than broadened. 
Are persons as "unfree" as the Judge be­
lieves they are'l The Judge does not enter into 
the metaphysical and unresolvable complexities 
of the ceaseless debate :J.bout free will, nor does 
he define what he means by free and unfree. In­
stead, he adopts, along with lawyers in general, 
an intuitive, common sense approach to free 
choice. The examples of unfree choices8 he cites 
probably :1re cases where the re:�sonable person 
would agree that there was a high likelihood 
that the p:�rticular crime in question would be 
committed.9 But does this "high likelihood" 
compel the conclusion that the actor was un­
free? 
A common sense and intuitive view would 
hold that although all of us choose our be­
havior, we are all the victims of various pres­
sures affecting our choices. All environments 
affect choices and make some choices easy 
and some choices hard. The pressure on a per­
son to break the law is certainly greater if all 
friends and neighbors do it than if they do not. 
On the average, it will be harder for the per­
son who lives in a "criminogenic" subculture 
to obey the law than for the person who lives 
in a crime-free subculture. Yet is is clear that 
the environemnt is not all-determinative: it 
interacts with intrapersonal factors. The major­
ity of persons in the most criminogenic subcul­
ture are law-abiding and there are members of 
law-abiding subcultures who break the law.10 
8
Bazelon, supra note 1, at 389. 
9 It should be noted that the Judge's analysis fo­
cuses particularly on crimes of violence. 
10 PRESIDENT'S CO!\!M'N ON LAW E NFORCE­
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT 
-AN ASSE SSMENT 70-71 (1967); see U.S. FEDE R­
AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 55 (1974) (total crime index repre­
sents only a small fraction of the population). 
Even if we assume that the actual crime rate 
exceeds the reported crime rate by 200-300%, and 
even though crime rates may be higher for some 
groups than for others, it is still true that the major­
ity of persons in any identifiable group do not com­
mit crime. 
WELFARE CRiMINOLOGY 
A person's behavior is a matter of harder 
choices and easier choices. But behavior is a 
matter of choice. 11 Judge Bazelon obscures the 
question by use of the words "free" and "un­
free," and thus masks the complex relation be­
tween compulsion and condemnation. 
The Judge wishes to admit into evidence all 
possible testimony about the causes of the de­
fendant's behavior so that the jury can decide 
whether the defendant w�ts unfree and not de­
serving of condemnation. This view assumes, 
of course, that a vast range of factors made a 
defendant's choices so hard that it is unjust to 
condemn him. But 'v hich choices are too hard 'J 
There is no bright line between free and unfree 
choices. Harder and easier choices are arranged 
along a continuum of choice: there is no scien­
tifically dictated cutting point where legal 
and moral responsibility begins or ends. Nor is 
there a higher moral authority which can tell 
society where to draw the line. All society can 
do is to determine the cutting point that com­
ports with our collective sense of morality. 
The real issue is where society ought to draw 
the line of responsibility - and by whom it 
should be drawn. 
Although condemning and punishing insane 
or otherwise unfree criminals may increase the 
general deterrent effect of the criminal law, this 
is not the principle reason the law-and-order de­
votee calls for the punishment of those Judge 
Bazelon wishes to excuse. Because the law-and­
order devotee does not believe that the choice 
to commit crime is usually an unfree one in 
any absolute sense, he wishes to punish every­
one who violates the law, or almost everyone. 
When the law-and-order adherent is con­
vinced that a choice to offend is sufficiently un­
free, he does not wish to punish the offender. 
He is simply not convinced that those Judge 
Bazelon considers unfree are, in fact, faced 
with sufficiently hard choices to justify acquit­
tal. Although the choice to obey the law may 
11 This statement is, of course, a statemen of be­
lief and values rather than a statement of fact. While 
it cannot be empirically proven, neither can it be em­
pirically disproven. Cf J. WILSON, THINKING 
ABOUT CRIME 43-51 (1975) (hereinafter cited as 
THINKING ABOUT CRIME]. In any case, the be­
lief that behavior is a matter of choice is a necessary 
foundation of the crimina! law. 
19 
be very hard in some cases, the law-ancl-ortler 
adherent believes that where there is choice, it 
is both moral and respectful to the actor to 
hold the actor responsible. Because the vast 
majority of persons faced with the hardest 
choices obey the law, no scientific or moral 
reason compels exculpation. 
Judge Bazelon believes his test of criminal 
nonresponsibility would force society to face 
its own complicity in the causation of crime. To 
end this complicity, Judge Bazelon proposes 
social welfare reforms as the truly moral so­
lution to the crime problem. According to the 
Judge, society can be blameless only if it has 
taken aggressive steps to alleviate the social 
and economic causes of crime .12 Conversely, 
the law-and-order adherent advocates im­
proving law enforcement techniques and the 
administration of criminal justice as the most 
effective means of ensuring public safety. 
This, according to the Judge, is the amoral or 
immoral view and any order produced by it will 
likewise be amoral or immoral.13 
The Judge argues that poverty causes crime,14 
that poor criminals cannot prevent themselves 
from violating the law,15 and that the only m oral 
solution to the crime problem is to eradicate 
poverty .16 After considering these assertions, I 
shall analyze his criticisms of the "get tough," 
law-and-order alternatives for ameliorating the 
crime problem. 
Poverty and Crime 
Throughout periods such as the 1960s when 
the allegedly scientific and therapeutic ap­
proach to crime was dominant, there were still 
12Bazelon, supra note 1, at 402-03. 
13 !d. at 401. 
14 [R] ather than focusing on what we do not know, 
I suggest focusing on what we do know . ... [WJ e know 
that poverty appears to be a necessary, though not a 
sufficient, condition for the occurrence of most vio­
lent crime. !d. at 403 (emphasis in original). 
15 !d. 
16 !d. The Judge's view is summed up in the follow­
ing words: "[I] t is simply unjust to place people in 
dehumanizing social conditions, to do nothing about 
these conditions, and then to command those who 
suffer 'Behave- or else!'" !d., at 401-02. 
law-and-order advocates who wished to con­
cen t rate on stricter enforcement and who felt 
that offenders should not be coddled by the 
courts or prisons. Such persons were seen as 
hardhearted, unscientific, and wasteful. The be­
lief was that if sufficient money were spent on 
the treatment of individual and social path­
ology, crime would be greatly abated, and in 
the end, there would be a net savings to so­
ciety. As a follower of the liberal social science 
tradition, Judge Bazelon similarly believes that 
poverty causes crime and poverty must there­
fore be eliminated in order to prevent crime. 
But does poverty cause crime?17 It is certain­
ly true that there is a very strong correlation be­
tween low socioeconomic status and the sort 
of violent street crime that worries urban 
America so much. Further, we must agree with 
Judge Bazelon that persons of low socioeco­
nomic status probably find it easier than others 
to turn to violent street crime for money, ex­
citement , or release. Yet it is also true that the 
majority of poor people are not violent crimi­
nals. Poverty is neither a sufficient nor a neces­
sary cause of crime. Poverty may make the 
choice to obey the law more difficult, but the 
poor have a choice whether to engage in crime, 
and the majority choose to obey the law. 
Will eradicating poverty eradicate crime? 
Improvement in the econom.ic conditions of 
poor persons does not reduce the level of vio­
lent crime. Rather, the opposite occurs- there 
is a rise in crime that accompanies most periods 
of rising wealth.19 The "poverty cure" does not 
work. Whether the failure is a result of poor 
conceptualization or insufficient resources, or 
both, is unknown. But neither the social nor 
the psychological treatment approach stems 
17 As we have seen, Judge Bazelon focuses mainly 
on violent crime, although such crime is only a small 
fraction of the total criminal behavior in our society. 
18 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE­
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT 
- AN ASSESSMENT 70 (1967). It is also true that 
the reason why poverty and crime are related is un­
clear. 
19 N. iv!ORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST 
POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 36 
(1970). 
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the alarmingly rising crime rates20 As the recog­
nition of failure becomes widespread, many 
persons, including this writer, have become con­
vinced that until the allegedly underlying causes 
of crime are understood, it is perhaps better 
and fairer to approach the crime problem by 
effective modification of the criminal justice 
system rather than relying on programs whose 
basic assumptions are as yet unproved. At­
tempting to eradicate poverty is a worthy so­
cial go:d, but it is one that should be pursued 
for its own sake and not in the belief that it 
will cure crime. 
Increased Social Welfare or Criminal 
Justice Reform? 
One result of disillusionment with the pov­
erty cure has been what Judge Bazelon has 
termed "get tough" measures, especially the 
suggestion of mandatory incarceration forcer­
tain criminals. In his critique of the get-tough 
position the Judge claims that get-tough meas­
ures attempt to divorce criminal justice from 
social justice. As I shall argue, some get-tough 
measures are actually sensible and fair. 
Judge Bazelon complains that it is unfair 
to claim that society cannot afford social 
justice. 21 He notes that in a truly egalitarian 
democracy, there is no alternative to the era­
dication of poverty and inequality. Further, 
because the GNP exceeds one trillion dollars, 
Judge Bazelon believes that there is no ex­
cuse for not meeting our obligations to social 
justice. Halfway measures will not do. 
While this complaint is appealing, it is un­
realistic. Our society already has made a mas­
sive committment to social welfare. Perhaps we 
have not gone far enough to suit the tastes of 
some, but it is clear that even if society's re­
sources were reallocated to a substantial degree, 
there simply is not enough money to fund the 
type of social reconstruction envisioned by the 
Judge. Reality must be faced; there is not 
enough money for everything. The most damn-
20 E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENL Y  CITY RE­
VISITED 179-80 (1974); see Martinson, What Works? 
Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 
PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1974, at 22. 
21 Bazelon, supra note 1, at 402-03. 
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ing rebuttal to Judge Bazclon's utopian solution 
to violent crime, however, is that even if pov­
erty were erased, crime would not disappear_ 
Judge Bazelon's second criticism of the pro­
ponents of the get-tough measures is that they 
are wrong in their belief that society should 
not waste precious resources attacking the un­
derlying causes of crime, e.g., poverty, because 
we know so little about them.22 The Judge ad­
mits that we do not understand all the causes of 
crime, but he suggests that we should focus on 
what we do know. In response, one must first 
point out that we do not understand any of the 
causes of crime. There are various factors which 
have a strong positive correlation with violent 
crime, such as youth and poverty. But social 
science is not yet ready to make firm causal 
statements. 
Judge Bazelon's third critique of get-tough 
measures is based on his claim that cost-effect­
iveness analysis is used to divorce crime con­
trol from socialjustice.23 For example, he claims 
that poverty is recognized as the root cause of 
crime, but because it is too difficult to deal 
with poverty, socie,ty has felt that it should fo­
cus on less deep-seated causes. This claim is 
incorrect. Poverty is not recognized as the root 
cause of crime; its eradication would not eradi­
cate crime. Eradicating poverty might eradicate 
some crime, but it is a vastly wasteful way to 
do so. If poverty can be eliminated, arguably 
we should do so - but not because it will 
eradicate crime_ 
Cost-benefit analysis of the crime prob­
lem is increasingly attractive because 
solutions based on ideology unsupported by 
substantial, hard evidence have been so waste­
ful. Before allocating limited resources, it is 
both wise and moral to analyze rigorously the 
claims that one proposal or another will "solve" 
incredibly complex and intractable social prob­
lems. Further, cost-benefit analysis need not ig­
nore moral questions. Every program has both 
moral "costs" and "benefits." One moral cost 
of spending money on a worthy social welfare 
project is that fewer funds are available for 
22Bazelon, supra note 1, at 403. 
23 Bazelon, supra note 1, at 404-05. 
other, equally worthy, projects. The moral 
benefit is that a worthy social goal may be 
achieved. One moral cost of a more repressive 
or intrusive law enforcement technique is that 
there will be inc reased infringement on liberty 
and privacy. The moral benefit is that greater 
public safety may ensue. No program, from 
any position, is free of moral costs. Moral costs 
and benfits should be included in the overall 
evaluation of any program. 
Judge Bazelon assumes that the law-and­
order position is explicitly amoral, because it 
favors more intrusive law enfocement to foster 
order. As the Judge admits, however, a society 
where citizens cannot live safely is incapable of 
moral development. The true question, then, 
is what techniques will foster order consonant 
with other competing moral values. To the 
extent t hat the social justice approach to crime 
has consistently failed to foster order, it is fair 
to consider further emphasis in this direction 
itself as immoral because other needy programs 
would be deferred and public safety would not 
be increased. 
Currently, therefore, many students of the 
crime problem are turning to cost-benefit an­
alyzed reforms of the criminal justice system 
as a means of achieving the moral goal of foster­
ing public safety. There is considerable argu­
ment that sensible and effective law enforce­
ment and criminal justice administration com­
bined with certain relatively simple private pre­
ventive measures would do much to lower the 
crime rate.24 
One major suggestions has been that crimi­
nals convicted of "dangerous" offenses be 
given fixed, mandatory sentences, because such 
a program would significantly reduce the crime 
rate.25 Judge Bazelon thinks this is immoral, 
24 Private preventive measures refer to such things 
as removing the keys from parked cars, obtaining ade­
quate locks, and avoiding walking on darkened streets 
in high crime areas and at riskier times of the day and 
night. The notion is that effective law enforcement 
and private measures will lower criminal inducement 
and opportunity, as well as deter criminals. 
25 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 143-44 (1971); THINK­
ING ABOUT CRIME, supra note 11, at 179-80; 
TWENTIETH CENTURY fUND TASK FORCE ON 
CRI!\!INAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN 
because poor criminals reasonably cannot be 
expected to obey the law. As I have shown, 
poor crim inals can and should be held 3ccount­
able for law violations. And m andatory senten­
ces for those convicted beyond a reasonable 
doubt of committing dangerous crimes are justi­
fied not only by general and specific deter­
rence, but also by the moral and useful notion 
of just deserts. Convicted criminals are pun­
ished because they have offended and thus de­
serve to be punished. 
Is it immoral to ask that the cost of reducing 
crime be borne by the morally responsible 
agents who have been convicted of crimes be­
yond a reasonable doubt, rather than by inno­
cent persons? If mandatory sentences of hu­
mane duration26 significantly reduce the crime 
rate (in contrast to poverty programs which 
have not done so), can it reasonably be claimed 
that such a program is amoral or immoral? To 
be sure, we cannot be certain which would be 
more effective, increased social welfare or crimi­
nal justice reform. But given this uncertainty 
and the past failures of social justice solu­
tions, it does seem clear that the social justice 
adherent is not entitled to claim that his posi­
tion is the moral one, and that alternative 
analyses and suggestions are immoral. 
Judge Bazelon is worried that cost-benefit 
analysis will lead to even further intrusions on 
the individual by the state and to further re­
pressive order.27 If newer law enforcement and 
criminal justice administration techniques do 
not work, he is afraid that more and unwel­
come repressive techniques will follow. Per­
haps he is right, but spending money for inef­
fective programs rather than for possibly e f­
fective programs is likely to encourage further 
increases in the crime rate, thus accelerating the 
demand for repression. It certainly is conceiv-
PUNISHMENT 15-18 (1976). But see N. MORRIS, 
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 30, 36-37 
(1974). 
26 Nearly all the more recent proponents of man­
datory sentencing or of the increased use of imprison­
ment have argued for sentences that are considerably 
shorter than those now auhorized for most offenses. 
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 
79-80 (1974). 
27 Bazelon, supra note I, at 404. 
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able that if violent crime became so prevalent 
that most people felt that their security and 
liberty were unconscionably threatened by 
criminal activity, a majority of society might 
gladly welcome more repressive measures. 
Judge Bazelon characterizes the assumption 
that a cost-benefit analysis will work as "hero­
ic."28 But even the Judge must apply cost­
benefit analysis to all his programs. For ex­
ample, increased social welfare would prob­
ably necessitate increased tax at ion. But in­
creased taxation, even for a moral goal, may 
infringe on other moral goals, such 3S the free 
accumulation and disposition of earned wealth. 
Social welfare and freedom of property are 
both legitimate, moral goals. Judge Bazelon has 
concluded that social welfare reform is the only 
moral response to crime. This conclusion must 
be based on an evaluation of the moral benefit 
to society of favoring property freedom at the 
cost of decreased security. In making this judg­
ment, the Judge is engaging in his own form of 
cost-benefit analysis. All rational programs are 
conceived and asserted by comparing them to 
alternative programs. It is not a question of 
"repressive order or moral order." Rather, it 
is a question of which moral values are to be 
promoted at the expense of which other moral 
values. Careful analysis of various programs 
helps us to decide these questions. 
Broadening the class of persons who are con­
sidered not responsible for their behavior seems 
dangerous to public order and disrespectful to 
the personal dignity of individuals. I believe 
28 !d. at 405. 
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that limiting the defenses of nonresponsibility 
would most benefit society. I propose that we 
constantly seek to limit these defenses in order 
to make clear to individuals that society views 
them as responsible persons who are in con­
trol of their lives and who are accountable for 
their actions. Self-control and moral behavior 
are always achieved with difficulty; but even so, 
the law's presumption of responsibility will 
encourage the internalization of control, the 
type of moral control the Judge seeks, as well 
as general deterrencez9 Finally, such a view 
treats all persons :1s autonomous and capable 
of that most human capacity, the power to 
choose. To treat persons otherwise is to treat 
them as less than human. 
Further, current get-tough proposals are 
hardly very tough or immoral; they are argu­
ably quite just. They are certainly worth try­
ing. If they are effective, they will prevent 
further repression - unlike ineffective programs 
which will occasion such repression. Perhaps 
our society will be willing to absorb an appal­
ling crime rate before instituting what most of 
us would consider a repressive order. But the 
prospect of a repressive order is not one I am 
willing to risk. I think that we should choose to 
get "tougher" before repressive order becomes 
a real danger. I believe that Judge Bazelon's 
solutions would be likely to bring us closer to 
the repressive order which both he and I would 
detest. 
29 See Andenaes, The Moral or Educative Influence 
of Criminal Law, in J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT 
AND DETERRENCE 1 10-28 (1974). 
23 
